Guidelines for remuneration to executives

Approved by the Annual General Meeting on 24 April 2023

The board of directors of Nederman Holding AB ("Nederman" or the "company") proposes that the annual general meeting 2023 resolves on the following guidelines for executive remuneration. In relation to the current guidelines, the proposal entails that the company has added a long-term variable remuneration for senior executives in accordance with the section "Long-term variable remuneration" below

These guidelines apply to the executives constituting group management. The guidelines are forward-looking and as such are applicable to remuneration agreed, and amendments to remuneration already agreed, after adoption of the guidelines by the annual general meeting 2023. These guidelines do not apply to any remuneration decided or approved by the general meeting separately.

PROMOTION OF BUSINESS STRATEGY, LONG-TERM INTERESTS AND SUSTAINABILITY

In short, Nederman's business strategy is to be "the Clean Air Company", and to use Nederman's industrial air filtration expertise and solutions and services to protect people, planet and production from the harmful effects of industrial processes. In this way, Nederman helps to create safer workplaces, efficient production and provide significant environmental benefits. A prerequisite for the successful implementation of the company's business strategy and safeguarding of its long-term interests, including its sustainability, is that the company is able to recruit and retain qualified personnel. The objective of Nederman's quidelines for executive remuneration is therefore to offer competitive remuneration on market terms, so that competent and skillful personnel can be attracted, motivated and retained. These guidelines enable the company to offer the executive management competitive total remuneration. For more information regarding the company's business strategy, please see www.nedermangroup.com.

TYPES OF REMUNERATION, ETC.

The remuneration shall be on market terms and may consist of the following components: fixed salary, variable cash remuneration, pension benefits and other benefits. Additionally, the general meeting may from time to time and outside the scope of these guidelines, resolve on other equity based remuneration. The remuneration committee shall monitor and evaluate remuneration for the executive management however all remuneration for the CEO is approved by the board of directors.

Fixed salary

Fixed salary is paid for satisfactory work.

Variable cash remuneration

Annual variable remuneration ("STI")

The short term incentive shall be linked to predetermined, well-defined and measurable financial criteria. The satisfaction of criteria

for awarding variable remuneration shall be measured over a period of one financial year (performance period). The STI remuneration may amount to not more than 50 per cent of the total fixed salary under the performance period for the CEO and for other senior executives. The criteria for STI shall mainly relate to the group's profitability, working capital development and sustainability goals that are linked to the business. In addition, individual criteria may be established. The criteria shall be designed so as to contribute to the company's business strategy and long-term interests, including its sustainability and since Nederman's business strategy is to be "the Clean Air Company" by protecting people, planet and production from the harmful effects of industrial processes, the criteria for STI, which are connected to the sale of the company's solutions and services within industrial air filtration, will inevitably contribute to the company's long-term interest and sustainability.

Long-term variable remuneration ("LTI")

The STI shall be supplemented by a long-term incentive connected to the development of the share price. By connecting the LTI to the share price development, a common interest is created with the shareholders that aims to promote the company's business strategy, long-term interests and value creation.

During year 1, the initial grant value of the LTI shall correspond to the STI earned during the previous year (the "Initial Grant Value"). The Initial Grant Value shall then be vested over a period of three years and indexed to reflect the share price development of the company's share. In year 2, the Initial Grant Value shall be indexed to reflect the share price development between the publication of the year-end report in year 1 and in year 2, following which 1/3 of the so indexed amount shall be paid to the executive. In year 3, the remaining (indexed) amount, shall again be indexed to reflect the share price development between the publication of the year-end report in year 2 and in year 3, following which ½ of said indexed amount shall be paid to the executive. In year 4, the remaining (indexed) amount, shall again be indexed to reflect the share price development between the publication of the year-end report in year 3 and in year 4, following which such indexed amount shall be paid to the executive. The share price index shall correspond to the increase or the decrease in the share price measured as the volume-weighted average of the price paid for the company's share at Nasdaq Stockholm during ten trading days immediately after the publication of a year-end report.

The LTI payout, shall be subject to an undertaking by the executive to invest the LTI payout in Nederman shares without undue delay and to retain such shares for not less than three years.

The STI plus the LTI paid out to an executive each year, may in aggregate not amount to more than 150 per cent of the total fixed salary for the CEO and not more than 100 per cent of the total fixed salary for other senior executives.

The costs associated with the variable remuneration are regular personnel costs associated with cash compensation.

Other variable remuneration

Further variable remuneration may be awarded in extraordinary circumstances, provided that such extraordinary arrangements are limited in time and only made on an individual basis, either for the purpose of recruiting or retaining executives, or as remuneration for extraordinary performance beyond the individual's ordinary tasks. Remuneration for extraordinary circumstances is not measurable, but the possibility for the board of directors to decide on such remuneration is considered important by the board of directors for the purpose of recruiting or retaining executives, or as remuneration for extraordinary work. Such remuneration may not exceed an amount corresponding to 50 per cent of the fixed annual salary and may not be paid more than once each year per individual. Any resolution on such remuneration shall be made by the board of directors based on a proposal from the remuneration

Pension benefits

For the CEO, pension benefits shall be premium defined. The pension premiums for premium defined pension shall amount to not more than 35 per cent of the pension based salary. For other executives, pension benefits shall be based on a contractual ITP plan or be premium defined, unless the individual concerned is subject to defined benefit pension under mandatory collective agreement provisions. Variable cash remuneration shall qualify for pension benefits. Pension premiums that follow from the contractual ITP plan or are premium defined, shall amount to not more than 35 per cent of the pension based salary, unless other premium levels apply according to applicable ITP plan.

For employment governed by rules other than Swedish, pension benefits and other benefits may be duly adjusted for compliance with mandatory rules or established local practice, taking into account, to the extent possible, the overall purpose of these guidelines.

Other benefits

Other benefits may include, for example, life insurance, health and medical insurance and company cars. Such benefits may amount to not more than 20 per cent of the fixed annual salary.

CRITERIA FOR AWARDING VARIABLE REMUNERATION, ETC.

The remuneration committee shall monitor and evaluate programs for variable remuneration for the executive management. To which extent the criteria for awarding variable remuneration has been satisfied shall be evaluated when the performance period has ended. The remuneration committee is responsible for the evaluation so far as it concerns variable remuneration to the CEO. For variable remuneration to other executives, the CEO is responsible for the evaluation. For financial criteria, the evaluation shall be based on the latest financial information made public by the company. Variable cash remuneration can be paid after the completion of a performance period or be subject to deferred payment. The board of directors shall have the possibility, under applicable law or contractual provisions, to in whole or in part reclaim variable remuneration paid on incorrect grounds (claw-back).

TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

The notice period may not exceed twenty four months if notice of termination of employment is made by the company for the CEO and twelve months for other executives. Fixed salary during the period of notice and severance pay may together not exceed an amount equivalent to the CEO's fixed salary for two years, and one year for other executives. When termination is made by the executive, the notice period may not exceed six months, without any right to severance pay.

SALARY AND EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS FOR EMPLOYEES

In the preparation of the board of directors' proposal for these remuneration guidelines, salary and employment conditions for employees of the company have been taken into account by including information on the employees' total income, the components of the remuneration and increase and growth rate over time, in the remuneration committee's and the board of directors' basis of decision when evaluating whether the guidelines and the limitations set out herein are reasonable.

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS TO DETERMINE, REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT THE GUIDELINES

The board of directors has previously established a remuneration committee. The committee's tasks include preparing the board of directors' decision to propose guidelines for executive remuneration. The board of directors shall prepare a proposal for new guidelines at least every fourth year and submit it to the general meeting. The guidelines shall be in force until new guidelines are adopted by the general meeting. The remuneration committee shall also monitor and evaluate programs for variable remuneration for the executive management, the application of the guidelines for executive remuneration as well as the current remuneration structures and compensation levels in the company. The members of the remuneration committee are independent of the company and its executive management. The CEO and other members of the executive management do not participate in the board of directors' processing of and resolutions regarding remunera $tion-related \, matters \, in \, so \, far \, as \, they \, are \, affected \, by \, such \, matters.$

DEROGATION FROM THE GUIDELINES

The board of directors may temporarily resolve to derogate from the guidelines, in whole or in part, if in a specific case there is special cause for the derogation and a derogation is necessary to serve the company's long-term interests, including its sustainability, or to ensure the company's financial viability. As set out above, the remuneration committee's tasks include preparing the board of directors' resolutions in remuneration-related matters. This includes any resolutions to derogate from the guidelines.

DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL CHANGES OF THE GUIDELINES AND SHAREHOLDER'S VIEWS

In relation to the current guidelines resolved by the annual general meeting 2022, the proposal for the annual general meeting 2023 entails that the company has added a long-term variable remuneration for senior executives in accordance with the section "Long-term variable remuneration" above.

The board of directors has not received any views from the share-holders on the guidelines for executive remuneration.